Introduction
An accurate and reliable evaluation of the level and content of cognitive processing is of paramount importance for the appropriate management of severely brain-damaged patients in altered states of consciousness [1 ] . Objective behavioural assessment of residual cognitive function can be extremely challenging in these patients, as motor responses may be minimal, inconsistent, and difficult to document, or may be undetectable because no cognitive output is possible. This difficulty leads to errors and a potentially high-level of misdiagnosis in the vegetative state [2-4], minimally conscious state (MCS) [5 ] and locked-in syndrome [6] . Recent advances in functional neuroimaging suggest a novel solution to this problem; so-called 'activation' studies can be used to assess cognitive functions in altered states of consciousness without the need for any overt response on the part of the patient. In several recent cases, this approach has been used to identify residual cognitive function and even conscious awareness in patients who behaviourally meet the criteria defining the vegetative state, yet retain cognitive abilities that have evaded detection using standard clinical methods. Similarly, in other studies, the cognitive capabilities of patients diagnosed as MCS have been explored using functional neuroimaging. Such studies suggest that the future integration of emerging functional neuroimaging techniques [7 ,8 ] with existing clinical and behavioural methods of assessment will be essential for improving our ability to reduce diagnostic errors between these related conditions. Moreover, such efforts may provide important new prognostic indicators, helping to disentangle differences in outcome on the basis of a greater understanding of the underlying mechanisms responsible and thus improve therapeutic choices in these challenging populations [8 ] .
Functional MRI
Until recently, the majority of neuroimaging studies in vegetative state and related disorders of consciousness (DOCs) used either fluorodeoxyglucose PET or single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) to measure resting cerebral blood flow and glucose metabolism [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Typically, widespread reductions in metabolic activity of up to 50% were reported, although in a few cases normal cerebral metabolism [17] and blood flow [21] were found in patients thought to be in a vegetative state. In some cases isolated 'islands' of metabolism were identified in circumscribed regions of cortex, suggesting the potential for cognitive processing in a subset of patients [17] . In one recent and remarkable case of late recovery from minimally conscious state, longitudinal PET examinations revealed increases in resting metabolism coincident with marked clinical improvements in motor function [22 ] . While metabolic studies are useful in this regard, they can only identify functionality at the most general level; that is, mapping cortical and subcortical regions that are potentially recruitable, rather than relating neural activity within such regions to specific cognitive processes. Methods such as H 2
15
O PET and functional MRI (fMRI), however, can be used to link distinct and specific physiological responses (changes in regional cerebral blood flow or changes in regional cerebral haemodynamics) to specific cognitive processes in the absence of any overt response (e.g. a motor action or a verbal response) on the part of the patient [23] .
Early activation studies in patients with DOCs used H 2
O PET, in part because the technique was more widely available and in part because the multiple logistic difficulties of scanning critically ill patients in the strong magnetic field that is integral to fMRI studies had yet to be resolved. In the first of such studies, H 2
O PET was used to measure regional cerebral blood flow in a posttraumatic vegetative patient during an auditorily presented story told by his mother [24] . Compared with nonword sounds, activation was observed in the anterior cingulate and temporal cortices, possibly reflecting emotional processing of the contents, or tone, of the mother's speech. In another patient diagnosed as vegetative, Menon et al. [25] used PET to study covert visual processing in response to familiar faces. When the patient was presented with pictures of the faces of family and close friends, robust activity was observed in the right fusiform gyrus, the so-called human 'face area'. Importantly, both of these studies involved single, well documented cases; in cohort PET studies of patients unequivocally meeting the clinical diagnosis of the vegetative state, normal brain activity in response to external stimulation has generally been the exception rather than the rule. For example, in one study of 15 vegetative state patients, high-intensity noxious electrical stimulation activated midbrain, contralateral thalamus and primary somatosensory cortex in every patient [26] . Unlike controls, however, the patients did not activate secondary somatosensory, insular, posterior parietal or anterior cingulate cortices.
H 2
15 O PET studies are limited by issues of radiation burden, which may preclude essential longitudinal or follow-up studies in many patients or even a comprehensive examination of multiple cognitive processes within any one session. The power of PET studies to detect statistically significant responses is also low and group studies are often needed to satisfy standard statistical criteria [23] . Given the heterogeneous nature of DOC and the clinical need to define each individual in terms of their diagnosis, residual functions and potential for recovery, such limitations are of paramount importance in the evaluation of these patients.
A significant development in this rapidly evolving field has been the relative shift of emphasis from PET 'activation studies' using H 2
15
O methodology, to fMRI. Not only is MRI more widely available than PET, it offers increased statistical power, improved spatial and temporal resolution and has no associated radiation burden [23] . Recently, Di et al. [27 ] used event-related fMRI to measure brain activation in seven vegetative patients and four MCS patients in response to the patient's own name spoken by a familiar voice. Two of the vegetative patients exhibited no significant activity at all, three patients exhibited activation in primary auditory areas and two vegetative patients and four MCS patients exhibited activity in 'higher-order' associative temporal-lobe areas. Whilst this result is encouraging (particularly because the two vegetative patients who showed the most widespread activation subsequently improved to MCS in the following months), it lacks cognitive specificity; that is to say, responses to the patient's own name spoken by a familiar voice were compared only with responses to the attenuated noise of the MRI scanner. Therefore, the activation observed may have reflected a specific response to one's own name, but it is equally possible that it reflected a lowlevel orienting response to speech in general, an emotional response to the speaker (see [28] ) or any one of a number of possible cognitive processes relating to the unmatched auditory stimuli. As a result, the interpretation hinges on a reverse inference, a common practice in neuroimaging by which the engagement of a given cognitive process is inferred solely on the basis of the observed activation in a particular brain region [29 ,30] .
Staffen et al. [31 ] used event-related fMRI to compare sentences containing the patient's own name (e.g. 'Martin, hello Martin'), with sentences using another first name, in a patient who had been vegetative for 10 months at the time of the scan. In this case, because identical speech stimuli were used which differed only with respect to the name itself, activations can be confidently attributed to cognitive processing that is specifically related to the patient's own name. Differential cortical processing was observed to the patient's own name in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex, similar to that observed in three healthy volunteers. These findings concur closely with a recent electrophysiological study which has shown differential P3 responses to patients' own names (compared with others' names) in locked in, MCS and some vegetative state patients [32 ] . Selective cortical processing of one's own name (when it is compared directly with another name) requires the ability to perceive and access the meaning of words and may imply some level of comprehension on the part of this Functional MRI in disorders of consciousness Owen and Coleman 633 patient. As the authors point out [31 ] , however, a response to one's own name is one of the most basic forms of language and may not depend on the higher-level linguistic processes that are assumed to underpin comprehension.
Recently, it has been argued that fMRI studies in patients with vegetative state and other DOCs should be conducted hierarchically [33] (see also [34, 35] ); beginning with the simplest form of processing within a particular domain (e.g. auditory) and then progressing sequentially through more complex cognitive functions. By way of example, a series of auditory paradigms was described that have all been successfully employed in functional neuroimaging studies of vegetative patients. These paradigms increase in complexity systematically from basic acoustic processing to more complex aspects of language comprehension and semantics. At the highest level, responses to sentences containing semantically ambiguous words (e.g. 'the ''creak/creek'' came from a ''beam'' in the ''ceiling/sealing'' ') are compared with sentences containing no ambiguous words (e.g. 'her secrets were written in her diary'), in order to reveal brain activity associated with spoken language comprehension [36] . A recent study [37] has explored the utility of this approach in the assessment of DOCs; residual language function in a group of seven vegetative state and five MCS patients was graded according to their brain activation on this hierarchical series of paradigms. Three of the vegetative state patients and two of the MCS patients demonstrated some evidence of preserved speech processing (when all sentences were compared with signal-correlated white noise), whilst four patients showed no significant activation at all, even when responses to sound were compared with silence. Most strikingly, two of the vegetative state patients showed a significant response in the semantic ambiguity contrast, consistent with high-level comprehension of the semantic aspects of speech. The authors suggested that such a hierarchy of cognitive tasks provides the most valid mechanism for defining the depth and breadth of preserved cognitive function in severely brain-damaged patients in altered states of consciousness.
A question that is often asked of such studies, however, is whether the presence of 'normal' brain activation in patients diagnosed with DOC indicates a level of conscious awareness, perhaps even similar to that which exists in healthy volunteers when performing the same tasks. Many types of stimuli, including faces, speech and pain, will elicit relatively 'automatic' responses from the brain [38] ; that is to say, they will occur without the need for wilful intervention on the part of the participant (e.g. you can not choose to not recognise a face, or to not understand speech that is presented clearly in your native language). By the same argument, 'normal' neural responses in patients who are diagnosed with DOCs do not necessarily indicate that these patients have any conscious experience associated with processing those same types of stimuli.
The logic described above exposes a central conundrum in the study of conscious awareness and in particular, how it relates to DOCs. There is, as yet, no universally agreed definition of consciousness and even less so self-consciousness or sense of self/being [39 ] . Deeper philosophical considerations notwithstanding, the only reliable method that we have for determining if another being is consciously aware is to ask him/her. The answer may take the form of a spoken response or a nonverbal signal (which may be as simple as the blink of an eye, as documented cases of the locked-in syndrome have demonstrated), but it is this answer, and only this answer, that allows us to infer conscious awareness.
Owen et al. [40 ,41 ] have recently adapted this logic using fMRI to demonstrate preserved conscious awareness in a patient fulfilling the criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative state. Prior to the fMRI scan, the patient was instructed to perform two mental imagery tasks when cued by the instructions 'imagine playing tennis' or 'imagine visiting the rooms in your home'. Importantly, these particular tasks were chosen, not because they involve a set of fundamental cognitive processes that are known to reflect conscious awareness, but because imagining playing tennis and imagining moving around the house elicit extremely reliable, robust and statistically distinguishable patterns of activation in specific regions of the brain [38] . Indeed, a recent analysis of these paradigms in a large group of healthy volunteers [42 ] has shown that they permit the identification of volitional brain activity (and thus of consciousness) at the singlepatient level, without the need for any motor response.
Given the reliability of these responses across individuals, activation in these regions in patients with DOCs can be used as a 'neural marker', confirming that the patient retains the ability to understand instructions, to carry out different mental tasks in response to those instructions and, therefore, is able to exhibit willed, voluntary behaviour in the absence of any overt action. During the periods that the vegetative patient was asked to imagine playing tennis, significant activity was observed in the supplementary motor area [40 ] . In contrast, when she was asked to imagine walking through her home, significant activity was observed in the parahippocampal gyrus, the posterior parietal cortex and the lateral premotor cortex. Her neural responses were indistinguishable from those observed in healthy volunteers performing the same imagery tasks in the scanner [40 ,42 ] (Fig. 1) . In a supplementary study [41 ] , noninstructive sentences containing the same key words as those used with the patient (e.g. 'The man enjoyed playing tennis') were shown to produce no sustained activity in any of these brain regions in healthy volunteers. It was concluded that, despite fulfilling all of the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative state, this patient retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or movement, confirming beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings.
Limitations
The findings of Owen et al. [40 ,41 ] raise a number of important issues regarding the use of fMRI in the assessment of patients with DOCs. First, although this technique provides a new means for detecting conscious awareness when standard clinical approaches are unable to provide that information, the method will not be applicable to all vegetative patients. For example, at 5 months post ictus (as was the case in the patient described in [40 ] ), the incidence of recovery of consciousness following a traumatic brain injury remains at nearly 20%, with a quarter of those recovering moving on to an independent level of function. Nontraumatic injuries are considered to have a much poorer prognosis. Similarly, the likelihood of recovery is much lower in patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for the permanent vegetative state (a decision process not started until 12 months posttraumatic and 6 months nontraumatic). In many of these cases, standard clinical techniques, including structural MRI, may be sufficient to rule out any potential for normal activation, without the need for fMRI.
More generally, the acquisition, analysis, and interpretation of fMRI data from patients with severe brain damage are also complex [43 ] . For example, in patients with brain damage, the coupling of neuronal activity and local haemodynamics, essential for fMRI activation measurements, is likely to be different from that in healthy controls [44] [45] [46] [47] , making interpretation of such data sets extremely difficult. Notwithstanding this basic methodological concern, the choice of the experiment is also crucial [33, 34] . For example, if brainstem auditory evoked responses are abnormal, auditory stimuli may be inappropriate and alternative stimuli -such as visual stimuli -should be considered. The investigation should also be complex enough that the cognitive processes of interest will be studied (i.e. preferably beyond stimulus perception), yet not so complex that the tasks could easily overload the cognitive capacities of a tired or inattentive patient. Many studies also suffer from the reverse inference problem described above [29 ,30] . In order that the imaging data obtained from patients with DOC can be interpreted, control studies are essential which must produce well documented, anatomically specific, robust, and reproducible activation patterns in healthy volunteers. In vegetative state, MCS, and locked-in syndrome, episodes of low arousal and sleep are common and close patient monitoring -preferably through electroencephalograph recording -during activation scans is essential so that these periods can be avoided. Spontaneous movements during the scan itself may also compromise the interpretation of functional neuroimaging data, particularly with fMRI scans. Processing of functional neuroimaging data may also present challenging problems in patients with acute brain damage. For example, the presence of gross hydrocephalus or focal pathology may complicate the fitting of functional imaging data to structural imaging data, and the normalization of these images through reference to a healthy brain. Under these circumstances, statistical assessment of activation patterns is complex and interpretation of activation foci with standard stereotaxic coordinates may be impossible.
Finally and most importantly, negative fMRI findings in patients with DOC should never be used as evidence for impaired cognitive function or lack of awareness [38] . For example, a patient may fall asleep during the scan or may not have properly heard or understood the task instructions, leading to so-called 'false negative' results. False negative findings in functional neuroimaging studies are common, even in healthy volunteers. Nevertheless, positive findings, when they occur and can be verified by careful statistical comparison with data from healthy volunteers, can be used to detect conscious awareness in patients, without the need for conventional methods of communication, such as movement or speech.
Conclusion
DOCs present unique problems for diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and everyday management. At the patient's bedside, the evaluation of possible cognitive function in these patients is difficult because voluntary movements may be very small, inconsistent and easily exhausted. fMRI appears to offer a complementary approach to the clinical assessment of patients with vegetative state and other altered states of consciousness and can objectively describe (using population norms) the regional distribution of cerebral activity under various conditions of stimulation. Indeed, in some rare cases, fMRI has demonstrated preserved cognitive function and even conscious awareness in patients who are assumed to be vegetative, yet retain cognitive abilities that have evaded detection using standard clinical methods. In our opinion, the future use of fMRI will substantially increase our understanding of severely brain-injured patients.
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